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1 Introduction
A long tradition in welfare economics and moral philosophy, dating back at
least to Sidgwick(1907) is the idea that all generations must be treated alike.
Perhaps, the most forceful assertion of this idea comes from Ramsey (1928) who
declared that any argument for preferring one generation over another must
come “merely from the weakness of the imagination”. The “equal treatment of
all generations” or the intergenerational equity principle has been formalised
in the subsequent literature as the axiom of Anonymity, which requires that
two infinite utility streams be judged indifferent to one another if one can be
obtained from the other through a permutation of utilities of a finite number of
generations. Since it also seems “natural” to require that any social evaluation
of infinite utility streams respond positively to an increase in the utility of any
generation, the Pareto Axiom is also desirable. Unfortunately, Diamond(1965)
showed that there is no social welfare function satisfying these axioms along
with a continuity axiom. In a more recent paper, Basu and Mitra( 2003) prove
a more general result by showing that the continuity axiom is superfluous.
These impossibility results are for social welfare functions. For many pur-
poses, it is sufficient to have a social welfare ordering which allows for com-
parisons of all infinite utility streams. In an important paper, Svensson (1980)
showed that such an ordering satisfying Anonymity and the Pareto axioms
does exist. However, Svensson’s proof is non-constructive. He constructs a
pre-order1 satisfying Anonymity and the Pareto axioms, and then appeals to
Szpilrajn’s Lemma which guarantees the existence of an ordering extension of
any pre-order. Since it is possible to show the existence of an ordering satis-
fying the two basic axioms, a natural step forward is to explore the existence
issue of orderings satisfying additional properties. Several recent papers have
taken this route. For instance, Asheim and Tungodden (2004) and Bossert et
al (2007) provide characterizations of different infinite-horizon versions of the
leximin principle. An infinite-horizon version of utilitarianism is characterised
by Basu and Mitra (2007).2
Like Svensson (1980), these papers also construct pre-orderings satisfying
desirable properties and then invoke Szpilrajn’s lemma to assert the existence
of an ordering. Of course, it is one thing to know that different infinite utility
streams can be compared consistently, and quite another thing to know how
1A pre-order is a binary relation satisfying reflexivity and transitivity. A pre-order which
is also complete is an ordering.
2See also Fleurbaey and Michel (2003), Hara et al (2006), Asheim et al (2007) for other
possibility theorems.
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to make such comparisons. The latter requires explicit knowledge of the form
of the ordering extension. Unfortunately, there is no constructive proof of
these existence theorems. Indeed, Zame (2007) demonstrates that an ordering
satisfying the two basic axioms cannot be explicitly described!
In this note, I describe some of the recent pre-orders which have been
proposed in the literature. Analogous to the literature on the rankings of
social states for finite societies, these pre-orders are the infinite horizon versions
of classic utilitarianism and the leximin principles. There are basically two
different ways in which leximin and utilitarianism have been extended to the
infinite horizon context. I use some simple examples to illustrate how these
different approaches compare with one another, and argue informally that one
method is perhaps better than the other.
I then go on to explore a consequence of imposing Separability3 axioms on
social welfare orderings. It is known that no ordering can satisfy the Pareto
axiom and a Strong Anonymity axiom which requires that two utility streams
be judged indifferent if one is obtained from another by means of a permu-
tation of an infinite number of generations.But, how severe is this violation?
Is there any systematic bias in how generations are treated? Since we do not
know the exact form of the various ordering extensions, these questions have
remained unanswered. I show that over a limited class of comparisons, Separa-
bility along with a weaker version of the Pareto axiom implies that the social
welfare ordering must exhibit time preference.4 In other words, there is indeed
a systematic bias in the way in which different generations are treated.
2 The Framework
Let N be the set of natural numbers. Let R+ be the set of non-negative real
numbers, and denote X ≡ RN+. Then, X is the set of infinite utility sequences.
A typical element ofX is an infinite-dimensional vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . .),
and the interpretation is that xn represents the utility experienced by genera-
tion n.
Let s be a finite sequence with elements from J . Then, s∞ denotes the
infinite sequence in which s is repeated infinitely often, while (s)k will denote
3Separability means that the ranking of two utility streams should not depend on the
utility levels of generations who are indifferent between the two utility streams.
4Banerjee and Mitra (2007) show that a Paretian social welfare function on the domain
of infinite utility streams must also exhibit a preference for the present over the future.
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the sequence in which s is repeated k times. For any n ∈ N, and k ∈ R+, (k)n
denotes the finite sequence in which k is repeated n times.
For any x ∈ X, let x−n = (x1, . . . , xn), be the first n terms of the sequence
x, and x+n be the sequence (xn+1, . . . , ). Hence x = (x
−n, x+n).
Given any x ∈ X, and n ∈ N, let x˜n be the permutation of x−n which
ensures that x˜−n is a non-decreasing sequence; let I(x−n) = x1 + x2 + . . . xn.
I will use the following notation for vector inequalities on X. For any
x, y ∈ X, (i) x ≥ y if xn ≥ yn for all n ∈ N; (ii) x > y if x ≥ y and x 6= y.
A social welfare relation (henceforth SWR) is a binary relation on X, which
is reflexive and transitive. For any SWR R, the interpretation is that if xRy,
then x is considered to be at least as good as y. The symmetric and asymmetric
components of R are denoted by the binary relations I and P . Of course, for
any x, y ∈ X, xIy if xRy and yRx, while xPy if xRy and not yRx. A social
welfare ordering (henceforth SWO) is a SWR which is also complete.
A SWR R is a subrelation to another SWR R′ if for all x, y ∈ X, (i) xIy
implies xR′y and (ii) xPy implies xP ′y. If R is a subrelation to R′, then R′ is
an extension of R.
A finite permutation of N is a bijection σ : N → N such that there exists
m ∈ N with σ(n) = n for all n ∈ N \ {1, . . . ,m}. Let σ(x) denote the utility
sequence which results from a finite permutation σ of x. I will use Σ to define
the set of all finite permutations of N.
Two fundamental axioms in the recent literature on intergenerational social
welfare rankings are the Strong Pareto principle and Finite Anonymity. These
are defined below.
Strong Pareto : For all x, y ∈ X, if x > y then xPy.
Finite Anonymity: For all x ∈ X, and for all σ ∈ Σ , xIσ(x).
The Suppes-Sen grading principle is the SWR RS defined on X as follows.
For all x, y ∈ X, xRSy iff ∃σ ∈ Σ such that σ(x) ≥ y
The grading principle RS is transitive, but not complete and hence is not
a SWO. However, it is a subrelation of any SWR satisfying the Strong Pareto
and Finite Anonymity axioms. Svensson (1980) established the existence of a
SWO satisfying these two axioms by invoking Szpilrajn’s lemma to conclude
that some extension of RS must be a SWO.
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3 Utilitarian and Leximin Relations
Since it is possible to show the existence of SWO’s satisfying the two ba-
sic assumptions, a natural step forward has been to explore the possibilities
of having social welfare orderings satisfying additional assumptions. In the
context of a finite society, much of the literature has focussed on axiomatic
characterizations of utilitarian and leximin social welfare orderings.5 Several
recent papers have taken this route in the ranking of infinite utility streams.
For instance, Asheim and Tungodden (2004) and Bossert et al (2007) provide
characterizations of different infinite-horizon versions of the leximin principle.
Infinite-horizon versions of utilitarianism are characterised by both Basu and
Mitra (2007) and Asheim and Tungodden(2004). However, as I have mentioned
earlier, none of these papers actually construct a SWO satisfying these axioms,
as they all use some version of Szpilrajn’s Lemma to demonstrate the existence
of SWOs. This section contains an informal discussion of the various rules, fo-
cusing partly on the difficulty which may arise if comparisons are based solely
on social welfare relations.
Consider, for example, different formulations of infinite-horizon utilitarian-
ism.
Basu and Mitra(2007) define what they call the utilitarian SWR RU as
follows.
∀x, y ∈ X, xRUy iff ∃n ∈ N such that (I(x−n), x+n) ≥ (I(y−n), y+n)
A different and more traditional method of comparing infinite utility streams
(without using discounting) is by employing the overtaking principle. There
are two versions of the overtaking criterion - the catching up criterion and
the overtaking criterion. Denote the corresponding SWRs as RC and RO. The
formal definitions follow.
∀x, y ∈ X, xRCy iff ∃n¯ ∈ N such that I(x−n) ≥ I(y−n)∀n ≥ n¯
∀x, y ∈ X, xROy iff either (i)∃n¯ ∈ N such that I(x−n) > I(y−n)∀n ≥ n¯
or (ii)∃n¯ ∈ N such that I(x−n) = I(y−n)∀n ≥ n¯
There are different extensions of the Rawlsian leximin criterion to the infi-
nite case. In order to define these extensions, it is useful to define the leximin
criterion on finite utility streams. So, let s and r be two finite sequences both
of length k, with s˜ and r˜ being the permutations of s and t which ensure that
they are non-decreasing sequences. Then,
sRkl r iff s˜ = r˜ or ∃j < k such that s˜i = r˜i∀i < j and s˜j > r˜j
5d’Aspremont and Gevers(2002) is an elegant survey of this literature.
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One version of the infinite horizon leximin rule, due to Asheim and Tungod-
den(2004) is the following.
∀x, y ∈ X, xR1Ly iff ∃n¯ ∈ N such that ∀n ≥ n¯, x−nRnl y−n
An alternative formulation of infinite horizon leximin is due to Bossert et
al (2007). They define the following SWR.
∀x, y ∈ X, xR2Ly iff ∃n ∈ N such that x−nRnl yn and x+n ≥ y+n
These definitions demonstrate that there have been essentially two ways
of extending utilitarianism and leximin to the infinite horizon. First, one can
define one utility stream x to be at least as good as another utility stream
y according to the utilitarian (respectively leximin) principle if there is some
period n¯, such that all finite truncations of x of length greater than n¯ are
deemed to be at least as good as the corresponding finite truncations of y
according to the finite version of utilitarianism (respectively leximin). The
catching up and overtaking criteria in the case of utilitarianism, and R1L in
the case of leximin fall in this category. Alternatively, one can declare x to be
better than y if there is some finite truncation of x of length n which is better
than that of y according to the utilitarian (or leximin ) criterion and x+n is at
least weakly Pareto preferred to y+n. The utilitarian SWR RU and the leximin
SWR R2L belong to this category.
The relationship between these two categories is clear. Consider, for in-
stance, the two leximin criteria. If xR2Ly, then from some period onwards, no
term in the sequence x is smaller than the corresponding term in y. So, if the
truncation of x is better than the truncation of y prior to this period according
to the leximin criterion, then x must come out better than y in all subsequent
comparisons. Hence, xR1Ly must be true. A similar argument holds for RU on
the one hand and RO, RC on the other hand. These “facts” are summarised
below.
Proposition 1 (i) RU is a subrelation of RO, which in turn is a subrelation
of RC.
(ii) R2L is a subrelation of R
1
L.
Leximin and utilitarianism are of course very different criteria, and much
has been written about the two classes in the finite context. Clearly, a different
kind of comparison can also be made in the ranking of infinite utility streams.
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For instance, is RU a “better” representative of utilitarianism than RO? Or
what about R1L versus R
2
L?
Consider, first the comparison between different representatives of utilitar-
ianism. Clearly, RU is more conservative in declaring one social state to be
preferred to another. So, at first sight, it may seem that RU is less likely to
jump to erroneous conclusions in so far as strict preference is concerned. In-
deed, this is precisely the point made by Basu and Mitra (2007) in the context
of an example which is almost identical to Example 1 below.
However, comparisons between social welfare relations can sometimes be
slightly misleading. For suppose RU is unable to compare between two alter-
native utility streams, while RO can compare the two. Do we “complete” RU
by declaring the two states to be indifferent? This can be problematic as I
demonstrate in Example 1. The problem arises because what matters is not
the SWR RU itself, but its ordering extension(s). In principle, a SWR may
have more than one ordering extension. Also, if R is a subrelation of R′, then
the ordering relation of R′ must also be an ordering extension of R, although
the converse may not be true.6
Given any SWR R, let R¯ denote some ordering extension of R. Of course,
R = R¯ if R is a SWO.
Consider the following example.
Example 1 Let x = (2, (1, 0)∞), y = ((1, 0)∞), and z = (1, (1, 0)∞).
Then, xPOy but neither xRUy nor yRUx. Basu and Mitra(2007) actually argue
that this is a virtue of RU because “there are an infinite number of future
generations who rank x below y”. But, now let us consider R¯U . Suppose xI¯Uy.
Then, the same intuitive reasoning must force us to conclude that yI¯Uz. But,
now we are in trouble because x Pareto dominates z, and so xPUz leading to
xP¯Uz. Transitivity decrees that xP¯Uy. Hence, the ordering extension of RU
must express a strict preference between x and y even if RU itself prefers to
remain silent!
In fact, this example demonstrates the following impossibility theorem.
Veto Power of Infinitely Many Generations(VPIMG) : For all x, y ∈ X, if
|{n ∈ N|xn > yn}| =∞, then xR¯y.
6In fact, if the ordering extension of R′ is the only ordering extension of R, then there is
nothing to choose between R and R′.
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Theorem 1 There is no SWO satisfying VPIMG and the Strong Pareto Prin-
ciple.
Proof. Consider x, y, z defined in Example 1. If R¯ satisfies Strong Pareto and
VPIMG, then xP¯y from Strong Pareto, and yI¯z and yI¯x. This is a violation
of transitivity.
Remark 3.1 Notice that the impossibility is precipitated even without any ap-
peal to the Finite Anonymity condition.
Basu and Mitra (2007) also argue that a “robustness” check on a SWR is to
check whether the ranking between pairs of infinite utility streams provided by
the SWR is preserved for discount factors close to one in the discounted present
value social welfare function. They then construct an ingenious example of a
pair of alternatives x and y such that xPOy but not xRUy, and the discounted
present value of y is strictly higher than that of x for every δ ∈ (0, 1). In their
example, the limiting values as δ → 1 exist and are equal. Basu and Mitra
argue that this implies that x and y should be deemed indifferent.
However, apart from the fact that discounting even as a robustness check
goes against the spirit of anonymity, it is not clear that the two utility streams
would be deemed indifferent according to R¯U . Moreover, as the next example
demonstrates, RU may fail to pass judgement on a pair of utility streams even
when the discounted present value of one is strictly higher than that of another
for all discount factors.
Example 2 Choose numbers b > a > 0, and let x = (2b, 0)∞ while y = (b, a)∞.
In this case, every finite truncation of x has a higher sum than that of y and so
x is preferred to y according to the overtaking criterion and hence the catching
up criterion. But, RU cannot compare between x and y since an infinite number
of generations prefer y to x, although for all δ ∈ (0, 1),∑∞n=1 δn−1(xn−yn) > 0.
Of course, being able to pass judgement is not necessarily a virtue. This is
illustrated in the next example.
Example 3 Let x = (1, 0)∞, while y = (0, 1)∞.
In this example, x and y are noncomparable according to the overtaking crite-
rion, but the catching up criterion declares x to be strictly preferred to y. In
the first stream, generations in odd periods get a utility of 1. The role of the
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“rich” and “poor” generations is reversed in the second utility stream, with
generations in even periods getting the higher utility. Clearly, a social welfare
ordering satisfying any intuitive notion of intergenerational equity should de-
clare the two utility sequences to be indifferent. Notice that RC does satisfy
Finite Anonymity, but not the stronger version which requires that two utility
streams be judged indifferent if one is obtained from another by means of a
permutation of an infinite number of generations.7
I come now to a comparison of the two versions of the leximin principle.
Consider again Example 1. Suppose n > 2 and n is even. Then, x˜−n will have
n/2 − 1 0s, followed by n/2 1s and one 2. If n is odd, then x˜−n will have
(n − 1)/2 0s followed by the same number of 1s and finally 2. On the other
hand, for n even, y˜−n will have an equal number of 0s and 1s. For n odd, y˜−n
will have (n+1)/2 0s and (n−1)/2 1s. So, for all finite truncations, x−nP nl y−n
and hence xP 1Ly. On the other hand, for no n will x
+n Pareto dominate y+n
and so R2L cannot compare the two. However, R
2
L implicitly gives veto power to
coalitions of infinitely many generations. Theorem 1 demonstrates the problem
with this principle.
However, the following example suggests that perhaps R1L declares strict
preference even when it should not.
Example 4 Let x = (0, 2∞) and y = 1∞.
The SWR R2L cannot compare the two utility streams. But, for all n, x˜
−n =
(0, 2, . . . , 2) while y˜−n = (1, . . . , 1). Hence, yP 1Lx. Notice however that except
for t = 1, x˜−nt > y˜
−n
t . Nevertheless, y is declared to be better than x. It
is known that while the finite horizon leximin rule has no individual as a
dictator, it is characterized by “positional dictatorship” of the worst-off rank.
The extreme importance given to one rank is obviously less defensible when
there are an infinity of positions.
4 Separability
In the context of a finite society, the axiomatic literature on the characterization
of interpersonally comparable social welfare rankings such as leximin and classic
7However, no SWR satisfies Strict Pareto and Strong Anonymity. See also the next
section where a Separability axiom along with a weaker version of the Pareto principle also
results in x being declared better than y.
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utilitarianism uses a separability condition which requires that the ranking
of two utility or welfare vectors should be independent of the utility levels
of “unconcerned” individual, that is individuals who have the same levels of
utility in the two vectors. In this section, I explore consequences of using the
Separability axiom in the ranking of infinite utiltiy streams.
There are different ways of formalising separability when there are an in-
finite number of generations. A particularly weak version of separability is to
require that if the “first” generation has the same utility level in two utility
streams, then the ranking of these two utility streams can only depend on the
utility sequences from period two onwards.
Separability : ∀ a ∈ R+, ∀x, y ∈ X, (a, x)R(a, y)↔ xRy
This condition, under the name of Stationarity, has been used extensively
in the literature on the utility ranking of infinite consumption streams.8
A stronger form of separability extends the definition to infinite sets of
unconcerned individuals. That is, suppose the comparison is between x =
(3, 0, 1)∞ and y = (2, 0, 2)∞. Then, all generations t = 2+3r where r = 0, 1, . . .
have the same utility in x and y. So, the stronger form of separability requires
that the ranking between x and y coincide with that between (3, 1)∞ and 2∞.
I need some more notation to define this stronger form of separability. Given
any x ∈ X and T ⊂ N, let x−T denote the subsequence of x which takes values
only in N− T . For any x, y ∈ X, let T (x, y) = {n ∈ N|xn = yn}.
Strong Separability: For all x, y ∈ X, xRy ↔ x−T (x,y)Ry−T (x,y)
A possible reason for objecting to the Strict Pareto condition is that when
there are an infinite number of generations, one utility stream should not be
judged strictly superior to another if just a single individual is better off and
all others are indifferent. A much weaker requirement is a “non-perversity”
condition which states that the social ranking must not respond negatively to
an increase in individual utilities. This condition is formalized below.
Monotonicity: ∀x, y ∈ X, if x > y, then xRy.
Even if a single individual’s strict preference (along with other individuals’
indifference) should not translate into social strict preference, it may be argued
that if a sufficiently large but finite number of individuals strictly prefer x to
y and all others are indifferent, then x should be strictly preferred to y. This
is the Finite Pareto principle.
8See for instance Koopmans (1960¡ Fishburn and Rubinstein)(1982). A slightly stronger
condition has been labeled the “Independent Futures” condition by Fleurbaey and Michel
(2003).
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Finite Pareto Principle: There is n¯ ∈ N such that ∀x, y ∈ X, if |{i ∈ N|xi >
yi}| ≥ n¯ and x > y, then xPy.
The three versions of utilitarian pre-orderings as well as the leximin pre-
order RL all satisfy Separability. Since they satisfy the Strict Pareto condition,
they obviously satisfy Monotonicity and the Finite Pareto principle. Notice,
however, that Szpilrajn’s lemma cannot be used to assert the existence of a
SWO satisfying these three conditions. Consider, for instance, R¯U , the ordering
extension of RU . The fact that RU satisfies Separability does not rule out
the existence of a pair x, y in X and a in R+ such that the pairs (x, y) and
(a+x, a+y) are noncomparable according to RU , but xR¯Uy and (a, y)P¯U(a, x)!
Of course, it is not easy to check whether such a pair exists since we do not
know the functional nature of R¯U .
In the following, I describe a characteristic of any SWO satisfying Separa-
bility, Monotonicity and the Finite Pareto principle if such an ordering exists.
I show that separability and strong separability imply time preference within a
limited class of comparisons, with the stronger form of separability leading to
time preference for a larger class of comparisons. I will first describe the type
of comparisons which result in time preference.
Throughout this section, I restrict attention to utility sequences which are
infinite repetitions of finite sequences. That is, comparisons are between se-
quences of the form s∞ and s′∞.
Now, consider two finite sequences s = (p, (0)k) and s
′ = ((0)k, p) where
p > (0)k for some integer k. So, s and s
′ are both sequences of length 2k,
where x is the sequence in which the terms p1, . . . , pk occur first followed by a
sequence of k zeroes. In y, the first k terms are 0, followed by the sequence p.
Also, note that each pi is non-negative with at least term being strictly positive.
Of course, any social welfare relation in the finite context satisfying Anonymity
must declare s and s′ to be socially indifferent, while discounting will imply
that s is better than s′. One can also say that in the comparison of infinite
utility streams, the social rule exhibits time preference if it declares that s∞ is
strictly preferred to s′∞. The next proposition shows that any SWO satisfying
Monotonicity, Separability and the Finite Pareto principle must exhibit this
kind of time preference.
Proposition 2 : Suppose R is a SWO satisfying Monotonicity, the Finite
Pareto Principle and Separability. Then, xPy if x = (p, (0)k)∞, y = ((0)k, p)∞
where p > (0)k for some integer k.
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Proof. Consider any SWOR satisfying Monotonicity and Separability. Choose
any x and y satisfying the conditions in the proposition.
I show that R cannot satisfy the Finite Pareto principle when yRx.
Define z = (p, x).
Step 1: I first prove that yRx implies zIy.
Notice that x ≡ (p, y) and y = ((0)k, x).
Since yRx, the repeated application of Separability ensures that (p, y)R(p, x).
Hence, xRz.
Since p > (0)k, Monotonicity ensures that (p, x)R((0)k, x). So, zRy. Hence,
from transitivity, xRy. So, xIy. This is turn ensures that xIz and so zIy.
Now, define zn = ((p)n, x) so that z
1 ≡ z. Also, define yn = ((0)kn, p), so
that y1 ≡ y.
Step 2: I now show that znIzn+1 and ynIyn+1.
Now,
zn = ((p)n, x)
= ((p)n, p, y)
From repeated use of Separability
((p)n+1, x)I((p)n+1, y)
Using Separability again,
zn+1 ≡ ((p)n+1, x)I(pn+1, y) ≡ zn
Similarly,
yn+1 = ((0)k(n+1), x)
= ((0)kn, y)
Making repeated use of Separability,
yn+1 ≡ ((0)kn, x)I((0)kn, x) ≡ yn
Steps 1 and 2 establish the theorem. Step 1 showed that z1Iy1. Step 2
shows that for all n ∈ N, z1Izn and y1Iyn. Hence, for all n ∈ N, znIyn. This
shows that the Finite Pareto principle is violated since (p)n > (0)kn.
The following proposition follows easily from the earlier one.
Proposition 3 : Suppose R is a SWO satisfying Monotonicity, the Finite
Pareto Principle and Strong Separability. Then, xPy if x = (p, (0)k)∞, y =
((0)k, p)∞ where p > (0)m for some integers m, k. with m ≤ k.
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Proof. Of course, Strong Separability implies Separability and so the case
of m = k has been proved already. So, take any m, k with m < k and x =
(p, (0)k)∞ and y = ((0)k, p)∞ where p > (0)m.
Since m < k, xn = yn = 0 for all n = m+ 1, . . . , k − 1, 2(m+ 1), . . . , 2(k −
1), . . . , t(m+1), . . . , t(k−1), . . .. Using Strong Separability, xRy iff x′Ry where
x′ = (p, (0)m)∞ and y′ = ((0)m, p)∞. Since p is also of length m, we know from
Proposition 2 that x′Py′. Hence, xPy.
Corollary 1 If x = (1, 0)∞ and y = (0, 1)∞, then xPy.
This is obviously a gross violation of intergenerational equity! It shows that
any SWO satisfying the stipulated properties must exhibit some form of time
preference. Notice that RC does rank (1, 0)∞ over (0, 1)∞. But, as I have
remarked in the previous section, this is an unappealing feature of the catching
up criterion. This section shows however that this is also an inevitable cost
associated with the Separability axiom.
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